We present a generalization of an abstract model of group choice in which the process of collective choice is modeled as a cooperative process of consideration and reconsideration of alternatives. We develop a general framework for studying choice from a finite set of alternatives, using the idea that one alternative may challenge -or displace from consideration -another in the course of a group choosing. From this binary relation -the "challenges" relation -new tournament solutions are obtained, the limit of which is the central object of the present study. The model presented generalizes that of contestation [Schwartz, 1990] and we characterize the set of alternatives that can be chosen in a collective choice setting when the process of collective choice is viewed as cooperatively considering and reconsidering alternatives. Basic properties of the family of tournament solutions studied is given as well.
Introduction
This paper examines the logical consequences of conceiving of collective choice as a process of consideration and reconsideration of alternatives. Specifically, this paper introduces a family of tournament solutions based on the binary relations obtained from criteria for choosing among alternatives (formally, from tournament solutions). In doing so, tournament solutions obtained as the top-set of binary relations is explored. We develop a general framework for studying choice from a finite set of alternatives, using the idea that one alternative may challenge -or displace from consideration -another in the course of considering and reconsidering alternatives as a collective choice. From this binary relation -the "challenges" relation -new tournament solutions are obtained, the limit of which is the central object of the present study. Identifying alternatives that are unchallenged or mutually challenged leads to a new family of tournament solutions, generalizing the Tournament Equilibrium Set (T EQ) of Schwartz [1990] .
We conceive of group choice as a cooperative process of consideration and reconsideration of alternatives. For example, when choosing from from set of alternatives, a group might consider alternative x. If alternative x is proposed as collective choice, what could replace (i.e. challenge) x in a process of cooperative re-consideration? Schwartz [Schwartz, 1990] argues only alternatives that are majority preferred to x are even possible challenges, as a majority could prevent z from replacing x when x is majoritypreferred to z. However, not all alternatives that are majority preferred to x could replace x as a final choice, Schwartz [1990] argues, because some of these alternatives are not real challenges as some would not be chosen by the group when considering possible alternatives to x. For example, if the group deems A to be a criteria arbitrating "better" and "worse" alternatives, some alternatives will fail according to A. Only alternatives deemed "better than x" will pose a real challenge to x. That is, not all possible challenges to x are actual challenges to x because some of these alternatives may fail the group's criteria for "betterness," A. If one interprets collective choice to be an eventual outcome of consideration and reconsideration in a cooperative game, the "challenges" relation may be used to define alternatives that may appear in final contracts. Alternatives that are challenged and do not challenge any other alternative are susceptible to being displaced from consideration, and hence one would not expect to see such an alternative as the outcome of collective choice.
Two factors are relevant for determining if one alternative may displace from consideration another: a criteria of challenging being a principal by which one alternative is deemed better than another (e.g. majority preference, covering, contestation, etc.) and the set of alternatives that are potential challengers, i.e. the set of alternatives a potential group choice is compared to. We operationalize the former via a binary relation capturing the idea that one alternative may be "better than" another. We model the latter via a neighborhood map -a method of selecting alternatives that are compared to a given alternative when a group considers it as a possible choice.
Perhaps surprisingly, we find many different notions of "challenging" lead to the same group choice. Indeed, when the set of possible challengers satisfies a minimal notion of majoritarianism (namely, equalling the Condorcet winner when there is one) we show that a large class of challenges-relations lead to the same collective choices. We show that the criteria of challenging -the criteria by which alternatives are evaluated -is far less important than the set of alternatives one is compared to. Indeed, in the limit the former plays virtually no role whatsoever in collective choice, while the later crucially distinguishes among sets of alternatives that may be considered possible collective choices.
Examples of the new class of tournament solutions as well as their relation to well-known tournament solutions are given.
An extensive general treatment of tournaments can be found in Laslier [1997] , who discusses tournaments as a tool for studying social choice under majority voting. Schwartz [1990] introduces one idea of "challenging" -the contestation relation and defines an important tournament solution, the tournament equilibrium set (T EQ) in terms of the top-set of the contestation relation, the properties of which have been studied in Dutta [1990] , Laffond et al. [1993] and Houy [2009] . 1 The present work departs from the above 1 Some of the most basic properties of T EQ were unknown until the recent discovery of Brandt et al. in a number of ways. Most importantly, we seek to identify the essential building-blocks of these models of collective choice. In doing so, we introduce a generalization of T EQ which yields a family of tournament solutions based only on neighborhoods -alternatives that are potential challengers to a collective choice. The utility of the exercise is not to suggest "superior" tournament solutions, but rather to shed light on the use and usefulness of binary relations obtained from tournament solutions for the study of collective choice.
After introducing the basics of tournaments (Section 2), we introduce a the challenges relation in Section 3, and a family of new tournament in solution 4. Section 5 introduces extensions and future work. Section 6 provides an illustration, relating the new family of tournament solutions to extant tournament solutions. Section 7 discusses this research, and concludes.
Preliminaries

Tournaments
Many of the definitions and basic results discussed in this section can be found in Laslier [1997] . A tournament, T , is nonempty finite set X equipped with a binary relation ≻ on X, such that for all x, y, ∈ X exactly one of x ≻ y and y ≻ x holds. That is, a tournament T := (X, ≻), is an irreflexive, complete and asymmetric binary relation on a finite set.
We interpret ≻ as the "beats" relation 2 so that x ≻ y, x, y ∈ X means "alternative x beats alternative y." No ties are contemplated, and no transitivity assumptions are made on ≻.
We refer to elements of X as alternatives.
[2013] who show that T EQ is not pair-wise intersecting and hence is not monotonic, and does not satisfy the strong-superset property [Laffond et al., 1993] .
2 Commonly taken to be a groups' majority preference relation A tournament may alternatively be defined as a complete, asymmetric directed graph, with X being the set of vertices. Denote the set of all tournaments on X by T (X). A tournament is irreducible if and only if there exists a directed path (under the ≻ relation) between any two alternatives. Define the following sets, for any x ∈ X, T −1 (x) = {y|y ≻ x}
In an abuse of notion, if T = (X, ≻) is a tournament, we denote |T | := |X| and
A major concern of social choice (as well as computer scientists -see Brandt et al.
[2009] ) is to identify "winners" from a given tournament. To that end, define a tournament solution as follows.
T ∈ T (X); and (3) respect for isomorphism: relabeling the elements of X does not affect the solution. 4 In words, a tournament solution (or just solution) is a a function S assigning
in a manner respecting isomorphisms. Intuitively, S arbitrates among elements of X,
Usually one imposes one of the following Condorcet criteria as part of the definition, but we keep them separate so that we can discuss both cases. A Condorcet winner of a tournament T = (X, ≻) is an element of X that beats all other elements of X, writing
Cond(T ) = {x ∈ X such that x ≻ y}. We say that a solution S satisfies the weak (respectively.
strong) Condorcet criteria if whenever a tournament T = (X, ≻) has a Condorcet winner x,
then x is among the S-winners (respectively. is the only S-winner) in T .
Binary Relations
We will also consider some binary relations that don't satisfy any specific axioms, but carry a suggestion that one alternative is "better" than another. To be able to define some terms, we will suppose ⊲ is some binary relation on a set X, pronounced "challenges".
Definition 2.2 Let ⊲ be a binary relation on a set X and let Y ⊆ X. Then Y is retentive for ⊲ (or is "⊲-retentive") if and only iff
Retentive sets consist of alternatives that are not challenged by anything not in the set.
It is well-known that if Y 1 and Y 2 are two ⊲-retentive subsets such that
is ⊲-retentive as well. As a consequence, two minimal retentive subsets are either equal or disjoint. When ⊲ is intransitive, maximality may be generalized as follows.
Definition 2.3
The top-set of a binary relation ⊲ is the union of the minimal retentive
subsets of ⊲ and is denoted T S(⊲).
The top-set generalizes the the concept of the top-cycle when ⊲ is incomplete. The topset of any binary relation is always nonempty since there exists a nonempty retentive set (X itself) and therefore a minimal such set.
Tournament Equilibrium Set
Given a solution S, Schwartz [1990] introduces a binary relation obtained from S he called bears on 5 as follows. If S is an solution, T = (X, ≻) is a tournament and x, y ∈ X, then we say that x bears on y if x is an S-winner among those alternatives that beat y and write xB S,T y. Less briefly, consider the elements of X that beat y, T −1 (y). If this is empty then nothing bears on y. Otherwise, T −1 (y) ⊆ X becomes a tournament by restricting ≻ to it.
Since it is a tournament, S specifies one or more winners, and these are the alternatives that bear on y.
Definition 2.4 Let S be a tournament solution and T be a tournament on X. Define the contestation relation with respect to S, as the binary relation B S,T on X by
Given an tournament solution S, consider the sequence of tournament solutions de-
is the binary relation "bears on with respect to S k ." Brandt et al. [2010] showed that this process converges in the sense that S (k−1) and S (k) agree on any tournament with no more than k alternatives. 6 So the definition of S (∞) (T ) as S (k) (T ) for any k ≥ |T | is unambiguous. Furthermore, if S and S ′ are any tournament solutions then S (∞) = S ′(∞) , by Brandt et al. [2010, Theorem 2] . Hence, there is a single limiting tournament solution based on the iterated application of the top-set to the contestation relation. Combining Schwartz [1990] and Brandt et al. [2010] , this iterated tournament solution is also the unique fixed point of T S(B ·,T ) for any tournament T , and it is called T EQ:
T EQ(T ) = T S(B T EQ,T )
for all T ∈ T .
Our goal is to identify ways to modify the construction, to challenge the uniqueness of T EQ, while keeping its appealing recursive nature. Obviously the place to begin is the definition of B, which we generalize as follows.
Binary Relations from Tournament Solutions
We now define a class of "challenges" relations, one that can be defined by only considering proper subsets of X. Define a neighborhood map to be a function N that assigns to each alternative x in each tournament (X, ≻) a proper subset N X,≻,x of X, in a manner respecting isomorphisms. For easy of reading, denoteT (x) := T | N X,≻,x so thatT (x) is the beats-relation among the neighbors of x. We write just N x when (X, ≻) is understood. In the T EQ case N x is the set of alternatives that beat x, T −1 (x).
Definition 3.1 Given a neighborhood map N and a tournament solution S, we define a binary relation ⊲ N ,S on each tournament T = (X, ≻) by
Because S and N respect isomorphisms of tournaments, so does ⊲ N ,S .
When N and S are understood we write just x ⊲ y. We say that a binary relation arising by this construction (for some S) is definable by neighborhoods.
Solutions from Binary Relations
In this section we study the usefulness of ⊲ for collective choice.
Iterated Top-Sets
Motivated by Brandt [2011] , who examines the repeated application of the top-set of the contestation relation of general tournament solutions, we consider the repeated application of the top-set to general binary relations arising from tournament solutions. 
Fixed Solutions
Alternatively, one may examine fixed solutions. For given tournament solution, S, and a ⊲ that is definable by neighborhoods, define a fixed solution, S * N as
for all T ∈ T (X). In words, S * N (T ) is defined to be a fixed-point of the operator T S(⊲ N ,· ). For example, if ⊲ is taken to be the contestation relation, so that N T ,x = T −1 (x), we have S * N (T ) = T EQ(T ) for all T ∈ T [Schwartz, 1990] .
Results
In this section we study the existence and uniqueness of fixed solutions, and the convergence of iterated solutions. Importantly, the two coincide when ⊲ is definable by neighborhoods and yields a family of new tournament solutions. Proof : We must show that S (∞) (T ) = A (∞) (T ) for any tournament T = (X, ≻), and we proceed by induction on |X|. The argument is a slight variation on the previous one. For all x ∈ X we have |N x | < |X| (by definition of neighborhood map), so by induction we have (∞) (N x , ≻) . It follows that the binary relations ⊲ N ,S (∞) and ⊲ N ,A (∞) on X coincide. Since S (∞) (T ) and A (∞) (T ) are the top-sets of these binary relations, they are equal.
We have shown that the choice of neighborhood mapping N defines a tournament solution, and we will write S * N for it. So we have S * N = T S(⊲ N ,S * ) for any tournament. An immediate corollary of the above two propositions (stated below and without proof) is that if ⊲ is definable by neighborhoods then there is one and only one fixed solution (i.e., satisfying equation 3) and it is precisely the iterated top-set, S 
Properties of Fixed Solutions and Iterated Top-Sets
Note that the while S * N exists for any neighborhood map, N , it might not be a proper tournament solution as there is no guarantee it satisfy the Condorcet criterion. For example, S
(1) N might not satisfy the strong Condorcet criterion, as there is no guarantee that a ∈ Cond(T ) impliesT (a) = ∅. In this section, we identify conditions on a neighborhood map, N , for which S * N is a proper tournament solution. To do so, we introduce a version of the Condorcet criteria for binary relations. iff N X,≻,x is empty whenever x is a Condorcet winner in (X, ≻).
N satisfies strong Condorcet (sC) iff N x = ∅ and x ∈ N y for all y ∈ X other than x, whenever x is a Condorcet winner in (X, ≻). 
Illustration
There is a a surprisingly rich family of tournament solutions that may be defined via the method we present. The role of the neighborhood map N and relations of S * N to existing tournament solutions are illustrated in this section.
For example, the trivial solution, returning all alternatives, may be obtained by taking the neighborhood map to be all alternatives except one, and S 0 to be the trivial solution.
Claim 1 Let S 0 be the trivial solution (S 0 (T ) = X for all T ∈ T (X)). Fix T := (X, ≻) and let
The proof is trivial: for all alternatives y x, y ⊲ N ,S 0 x, for all x ∈ X. So S (1) (T ) = X.
Continuing, y ∈ S (1) (T X\x ) for all y x, for all x ∈ X, so S (2) (T ) = X. Clearly, then, y ∈ S (k) (T | X\x ) for all y x, for all x ∈ X and the result obtains. Intuitively, neither the neighborhood map nor the method of arbitrating depends on the details of the ≻ relation and hence iterating cannot help discriminate among alternatives in X.
As a more interesting example, define a neighborhood map by
for all x ∈ X (we call this the 'inclusive better neighborhood map' ). Define ⊲: S ×T → R as N satisfies strong Condorcet. Indeed, more can be said: it is a subset of the uncovered set [Miller, 1980] . Recall that for T ∈ T , alternative a covers alternative b in T iff T (a) ⊇ {b ∪ T (b)}. In words, a covers b in T if a beats b, and beats everything that b beats. The uncovered set of T , denoted U C(T ), is the set of alternatives not covered in T . The uncovered set has been studied, among other places, in Miller [1980] , Shepsle and Weingast [1984] , Cox [1987] , Feld et al. [1987] , Epstein [1997 ], Miller [2007 . 
The top-cycle of U C(T ) is equal to {v 1 , v 2 , v 3 }. For the interested reader, we note that
Proposition 6.1 along with the above two examples, lead us to conjecture that S 
Discussion
We model the process of group choice by cooperative reconsideration of alternatives. The intuitive process of group choice we model can be described as follows. A group starts with a criteria by which alternatives are arbitrated "better" or "worse", A. The group then considers each alternative, finding "better" alternatives to each, using whatever scheme A uses to arbitrate only those alternatives in their (respective) neighborhoods. That is, if alternative x is under consideration as a potential group choice, then only alternatives in the neighborhood of x are even possible challenges to it. Then A (1) declares an alternative x 0 unfit for collective choice (displaced from consideration) if there is a x 1 that challenges it, unless every chain x 0 , . . . , x m , with each x i challenging x i−1 , can be extended to such a chain x 0 , . . . , x m , x m+1 , . . . , x n with x n = x 0 . If one accepts that A is a "reasonable" way to evaluate alternatives in tournaments smaller than T , then one is forced to accept that A (1) is a "reasonable" way to evaluate alternatives in a tournament T . Continuing, if a group starts with a criteria of arbitrating "challengers" from non-challengers, A, and alternatives are compared/ reconsidered according to the neighborhood map, N , then the group is logically committed to choosing alternatives only in A (∞) N . Perhaps surprisingly, we showed that this set is does not depend on the initial "challenging" criteria, A, but rather does depend on set of potential challengers (on which alternatives one is compared to), N . Indeed, if we restrict attention to binary relations that are definable by neighborhoods, then Propositions 1 and 2 establish a family of tournament solutions, parameterized only by a neighborhood map, N . By way of example, it is shown that the family contains well-know tournaments solutions (for example, the trivial solution, as well as T EQ) and some solutions distinct from the extant solutions T EQ, uncovered set and the idempotent uncovered set (Section 6).
The majority preference relation has long held a central role in the theory and study of collective choice. General, extra-majoritarian relations among alternatives play an increasing role in the study of group choice, however [Schwartz, 1974; Miller, 1980; Schwartz, 1986; Patty, 2008] . The results of Moser [2012] together with Brandt [2011] suggest an examination of binary relations derived from tournament solutions, and the top-sets thereof. We introduce a framework for doing so and showed its potential usefulness for the study of choice from tournaments. Indeed, the essential component in the construction of tournament solutions in Schwartz [1990] and Brandt [2011] lies in the set of alternatives that are potential challenges to a possible collective choice.
Several questions remain regarding this family of tournament solutions, most obviously those of inheritance. Does S 
N (T ) = {x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , x 4 , x 5 , x 6 } = U C(T ). As U C(T ) forms a T -cycle, the top-cycle of U C(T ) is equal to U C(T ). For the interested reader, we note that T EQ(T ) = {x 1 , x 2 , x 3 }. 
